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Abstract
This study documents the deterministic factors and the magnitude of earnings 
management of Nigerian firms by applying five discretionary accruals models using the cohort 
of 62 firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) over a period of 2003-2012. It is 
observed that the Kothari et al. (2005) performance matched model provides better explanatory 
power to determine the magnitude of earnings management of Nigerian companies. Using this 
model, the study finds that the magnitude of earnings management is 5.02 percent, on average. 
However, the industry-wise analyses disclose that earnings management is dominant within the 
manufacturing and energy sector of the Nigerian economy at 48.38 percent followed by the 
41.93 percent in the consumer goods sector. The study reveals that the effectiveness of 
monitoring role by internal and external shareholders is insignificant in improving firm’s 
transparency in financial reporting activities. This finding is indeed useful for Nigerian 
companies and policymakers to restructure the dynamics o f ownership structure in a way that can 
reduce the extent of earnings management in the manufacturing, energy and consumer goods 
sectors in Nigeria.
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Chapter One: Introduction
Aggressive earnings management has been of greater concern to regulatory authorities 
around the globe and in particular, Nigerian business environment. Accordingly, the concern 
was intensified following evidence of inappropriate accounting disclosures and financial 
recklessness that led to the collapse of five biggest Nigerian banks in 2009 and the Cadbury 
Nigeria Pic scandal in 2006. These incidences further prove the need for regulatory authorities to 
tighten the financial reporting activities of publicly listed companies in Nigeria. The reliance on 
financial reports provides a basis in which investors and owners o f firms usually appraise the 
performance of their companies. Earnings (net profits) are referred to as the main determinant of 
firm’s economic performance and they also provide important information for potential decision 
about investment. In order to either meet the expectations of shareholders or the desire for 
personal gains, executive managers render misleading financial results. This is achieved by 
taking advantage of how accounting rules of the Generally Accepted Accounting Practices 
(GAAP) are applied to manage the reported earnings in any financial year.
Earnings management is widespread among companies in the world. The menace has 
been proven by past corporate failures such as Xerox, Enron, WorldCom and Parmalat. Hence, 
such failures have undermined the credibility of audited financial reports and have cast doubt in 
the minds of shareholders as to the true economic and financial position of firms. In general, 
earnings management is defined as follows:
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“Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in 
structuring truncations that alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders 
about the underlining economic performance of the firm or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depends on reported accounting numbers” (Healy and Wahlen, 1999, 
p.368).
Earnings management is seemingly difficult to detect. CEOs use earnings management to 
misrepresent firm’s financial performance to individual stakeholders of their companies 
including regulatory authorities, shareholders, and creditors. There are several reasons that 
encourage managers to engage in earnings management. First of all, managers always desire to 
meet shareholders’ and analysts’ expectations. However, some earnings management practices 
are out of misinterpretation of accounting framework in use while some are deliberate actions to 
mislead shareholders about CEO performance. A great deal of prior literature endeavor to 
understand why earnings are manipulated by firms, how it is manipulated, and how such 
misrepresentation is detected. Some of the motivations are highlighted below:
• Desire to meet shareholders’ and analysts’ expectations
Bartov, Givoly, and Hayan (2002) note that the motivations often suggested for such a 
behavior are to maximize share price, to boost management’s credibility for being able to meet 
the expectations of stockholders and creditors, and to avoid litigation costs that could potentially 
be triggered by unfavorable earnings surprises. In a sample of nearly 130,000 quarterly earnings 
forecast covering over approximately 65,000 firm-quarters observed for 14 years (1983-1997) 
consisting of U.S. firms, Bartov et al. (2002) document a significant result. The authors find a 
positive relationship between abnormal returns and positive earnings surprises. They document a
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3.2 percent increase in stock returns, on average, during the quarters ending with a positive 
earnings suiprises compared to those across the quarters with negative earnings surprises. 
However, the authors also point out that the reward to shareholders for meeting analysts’ 
expectation is high market valuation of their stocks while the penalty for failing to achieve the 
target is to experience low stock valuation. Beating analysts’ earnings expectation is therefore 
well entrenched in today’s corporate culture given a strong connectivity between stock valuation 
and earnings information (Bartov et al., 2002). In this regard, earnings management is not 
unlikely. There are however evidence that earnings manipulation has an adverse impact in the 
long run. For instance, Cadbury Nigeria Pic scandal in 2006 was tagged the Nigerian version of 
the Enron Corporation scandal. The CEO deliberated overstatement of financial position over a 
number of years (2002-2005) up to $122 million (N15 million) in order to meet and exceed their 
ambitious growth targets, which ultimately affected the company’s affiliates worldwide 
(ThisDay Live, 2012).
• To ensure post-corporate event success
High magnitude of corporate events, such as, merger and acquisition, management buy­
out and initial public offering etc. motivate firms to manage reported earnings. Ericson and 
Wang (1999) find that acquiring firms in merger tends to manage earnings upward prior to the 
merger. Likewise, Teoh et al. (1998a and 1998b) argue that managers usually manipulate 
reported earnings prior to initial public offerings (IPO) and seasoned equity offerings.
• To satisfy manager’s personal gains
Managers are benefitted from various incentives that encourage earnings management. 
Debt agreement or job security also constitutes incentive for managing earnings. Investigations
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into the Cadbury Nigeria Pic’s case uncovered an undisclosed offshore remuneration package 
paid to the executives by the company’s board (ThisDay Live, 2012). For instance, Adewale 
(2013) reports that early in 2006, Cadbury Schweppes Pic, the UK parent company of Cadbury 
Nigeria Pic, made considerable effort to increase its shareholdings from 46 to 50 percent in 
Cadbury Nigeria Pic. In the process of performing its due diligence of the Nigerian corporation, 
material overstatements were discovered in the books. Further, in October 2006, the board of 
Cadbury Nigeria Pic declared to its stockholders and regulatory bodies of the discovery of 
overstatements in the accounts during the period 2002-2005. Price Water House Coopers (PWC), 
an independent audit firm, reported an overstatement of earnings in between N13billion and 
M15billion to the board of Cadbury Nigeria Pic. As a result, the CEO and the Finance Director 
were eventually sacked. Further investigations revealed that such overstatement was initiated by 
the sacked executives to fulfil their personal gains. Consequently, the parent company (Cadbury 
Schweppes Pic) made a provision of £15million as impairment of goodwill held in respect of 
Cadbury Nigeria Pic.
Therefore, earnings management is by no means a risk-free venture as there are vast 
majority of adverse effects (e.g. drop in share price) and the consequences are greatly severe. 
Extant literature highlights the consequences originating from earnings management activities. 
Some of them that are relevant in context to Nigerian companies are as follows:
• Reputational risk
Companies that suffer reputational damage due to corporate scandals experience severe 
consequences. Regulatory investigation, high cost of capital, and low market share following 
earnings management announcement are some outcomes resulted from reputational risk. Similar
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incidences were faced by Cadbury Nigeria Pic. Likewise, several renowned international and 
local firms, such as Enron, WorldCom, Arthur Anderson, Intercontinental bank, Oceanic bank, 
Afribank, Finbank and Union bank, suffered from reputation damage as a result o f earnings 
manipulation. These firms were either bought over or went into complete liquidation after the 
event. Steven and Susan (2004) suggest that while CEOs that develop favorable reputation get 
rewarded when they act in good faith (integrity), CEOs that engage in abusive or dysfunctional 
behaviors weigh up the short-term monetary gains (benefits) and face long-term consequences 
from a loss of own reputation.
• Litigation risk
In most instances, public disclosure of earnings manipulation is followed by court cases 
from aggrieved shareholders and other concerned stakeholders. In a policy working paper, 
Brown, Hillegeist, and Lo (2005) find that litigation risk is positively associated with the 
likelihood of bad news forecasts. As an example, the auditor and the board of Cadbury Nigeria 
Pic. were sued by over 300 shareholders for breach of duty that caused a magnificent amount of 
financial loss to shareholders (ThisDay Live, 2012).
• Loss of investors’ confidence
Earnings management leads to loss in confidence by investors of firms that have had 
cases of earnings manipulation. The loss in investors’ confidence is usually followed by decline 
in share prices of affected companies. Cadbury Nigeria Pic’s share value dropped by 5 percent 
on the Nigerian stock exchange (NSE) following the announcement of material overstatement in 
their financial accounts (ThisDay Live, 2012). The loss of investors’ confidence is not limited to 
the affected companies, but also to the reputable auditors concerned. The breach of professional
negligence by Akintola William & Deloitte (Chartered Accountants) for their failure to uncover 
the material overstatement in Cadbury’s financial accounts over four successive financial years 
resulted in massive loss to shareholders. As a result, aggrieved shareholders filed a law suit 
against Akintola William & Deloitte due to their disappointment in the fraud case of Cadbury 
Nigeria Pic.
•  Regulatory penalty/suspension
Regulators are always worried over areas of misrepresentation of accounting facts and 
figures, inadequate disclosure, and non-compliance of corporate governance code, regulatory and 
legal frameworks by firms. Such non-compliance and irregularities attract severe penalty. For 
example, Cadbury Nigeria Pic was sanctioned by the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
and asked to pay a fine of N100, 000 in the first instance and a penalty of W 5,000 per day from 
30 June 2002 to 14 December 2006 due to unethical practices in reporting (The Citizen Online, 
2013).
Due to all of the above consequences experienced by one of the largest Nigerian 
companies, earnings management is becoming a critical issue in the domain of Nigerian 
corporate governance. Determining the extent of earnings management and characterizing the 
companies that are heavily exposed to such incidence is therefore important for structuring 
policy guideline for Nigerian companies. This study will contribute to the business and literature 
in this direction.
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1.1 Motivation of the Study
The situation of Nigerian firms is similar to those in other developing countries where 
deliberate manipulation and misappropriation of shareholders’ funds are rampant. However, the 
opportunistic behavior of executive managers is observed due to:
• Weak legal and financial reporting frameworks;
• Unbalanced share ownership structure that is the segregation of ownership from control; 
and
• Corruption, political interference through political appointees in the affairs o f the firms 
and other vested interest.
Eliminating the above challenges will make Nigerian economy a more realistic target for 
cross border investments that will further increase the development of the Nigerian capital 
market and economic buoyancy of the nation. However, a strict regulatory procedure and the 
implementation of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) and a well-balanced 
share ownership structure would help in reducing, if not completely eliminate, earnings 
management among Nigerian companies. It is therefore critical to know the magnitude of 
earnings management in major sectors of the country, and understand the effectiveness of 
existing corporate ownership structure in controlling earnings manipulation. The major objective 
of this thesis is to examine both issues for policy recommendation.
1.2 Significance of the Study
The research has at least three potential benefits to literature:
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• First, by analyzing the magnitude of earnings management for Nigerian firms using 
discretionary accruals, the study will be able to shed light on how such activities can be 
curtailed.
• Second, the study will apparently be conducting one of the first in-depth comparative 
analyses o f earnings management in Nigerian context.
• Finally, the findings can add to the efforts to better understand the effectiveness of the 
ownership structure of the Nigerian corporate entities.
1.3 Research Objectives of the Study
This study aims to contribute to existing literature of earnings management by addressing 
the following research questions:
L Which model gives the best estimation o f the level o f  discretionary accruals in Nigerian 
context?
In existing literature of earnings management, five empirical models including Healy 
(1985), DeAngelo (1986), Jones (1991), Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005) are 
widely used to estimate the level of corporate earnings manipulation. This study will recommend 
a specific model out of the above five models that best explains the level of earnings 
management for Nigerian publicly listed companies.
ii. What is the magnitude o f earnings management in Nigeria?
Among the published earnings management literature in Nigeria till date, there have not 
been studies in great details that have estimated the level of earnings management in Nigeria.
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The literature has mainly limited its studies to corporate governance, the effect of institutional 
investors on firms’ earnings and board composition. To cover this gap in literature, the study will 
estimate the level of earnings management of companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
(NSE). To address this research question, the study will also determine sector-specific magnitude 
of earnings management in Nigeria.
iiL What are the characteristics o f  Nigerian firms that are potential candidates o f  earnings
management?
Weak legal and regulatory frameworks inherent in the Nigerian business environment as 
well as inappropriate governance structures create potential avenues for earnings management. 
Addressing this question will help to distinguish some credible firms which have high chance of 
earnings manipulation. Identifying these firms will allow their stakeholders to initiate appropriate 
preventive measures in advance. The study will also examine whether existing ownership 
structure allows Nigerian companies to reduce the level of earnings management.
This study is organized as follows: Chapter II will discuss prior literature and develop 
hypotheses for empirical investigation related to earnings management. Chapter III discusses 
data and methodology used in the study. In Chapter IV, we will discuss empirical results and 
explain some of our findings. Concluding remarks and policy recommendation about earnings 
management for Nigerian companies will be provided in Chapter V.
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Chapter Two: Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
This chapter reviews related literature on earnings management and develop the 
hypotheses for empirical investigation of Nigerian companies. The chapter is organized as 
follows: Section 2.1 briefly reviews other definitions and presents an overview of earnings 
management; Section 2.2 outlines related literature on agency theory and earnings management; 
and Section 2.3 summarizes the results of empirical investigation related to earnings 
management.
2.1 Overview of Earnings Management
In addition to the widely accepted definition of earnings management by Healy et al. 
(1999), more social science researchers provide further description of earnings management. For 
example, Ronen and Yaari (2008) summarize and group previous definitions of earnings 
management into three distinctive categories of: (a) white earnings management, (b) gray 
earnings management, and (c) black earnings management. They suggest that:
White earnings management is taking the advantage of the flexibility in the choice of 
accounting treatment to signal the manager’s information on future cashflows. 
Meanwhile, the Gray earnings management is choosing an accounting treatment that is 
either opportunistic (maximizing the utility of management only) or economically 
efficient, and Black is the practice of using tricks to misrepresent or reduce transparency 
of the financial reports (Ronen and Yaari, 2008, p.25).
The authors differentiate that the black categorization o f earnings management is fraud 
and outright misrepresentation of financial information. At the same time, gray earnings
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management simply means the manipulation of financial reports within the legal boundaries 
which could either be value maximization or opportunistic in nature. While the management of 
earnings that further add to firms credibility and accountability of financial reports is categorized 
as white.
Another definition by Beneish suggests that “earnings manipulation is an instance where 
management violates the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) in order to 
beneficially represent the firm’s financial performance” (Beneish, 1999, p.3). Meanwhile, other 
literature has documented two possible techniques used by the executive management of firms in 
accomplishing earnings management. The techniques are the accrual accounting method and the 
real activities manipulation. These two techniques are the immoral ways of managing the 
reported earnings of firms.
Accrual is an accounting method that recognizes economic events when they take place, 
regardless of when cash is exchanged (Investopedia, 2014). According to Healy (1985), accruals 
modify the timing of the reported earnings of firms. Accordingly, the author further asserts that 
non-discretionary accruals (NDA) and discretionary accruals (DA) are the two ways of 
understanding earnings management as accruals management. Non-discretionary accruals are 
accounting adjustments to firms’ cash flows as dictated by accounting standard setting bodies. 
Discretionary accruals are adjustments to cash flows chosen from the opportunity set of 
generally accepted accounting procedures as stipulated by the standard setting bodies. For 
instance, “the depreciation method, bad debts provisioning, loan loss reserves and the allocation 
of fixed factory overhead cost between cost of goods sold and inventories are the specific 
accruals that have been employed in accomplishing earnings management” (Healy, 1985, p.89).
11
Likewise, Roychowdhury (2006) states that the manipulation of real (operational) 
activities affects firms’ cash flows and accruals in some cases, and thus defines this kind of 
manipulation accordingly as: “a management action that deviate from normal business practices, 
undertaken with the primary objective of meeting certain earnings threshold” (Roychowdhury, 
2006, p.337). Consequently, Roychowdhury (2006) documents certain examples of real activities 
manipulation methods that managers extensively engage in to meet targets. For instance, “price 
discounts to temporarily increase sales, engaging in over production to lower cost of goods sold 
(COGS), delay in recording research and development (R&D) maintenance expenditure, 
alterations in shipment schedules and aggressive reduction of discretionary expenditures to 
improve margins” (Roychowdhury, 2006, p.337). Finally, the author opine that the act of real 
activities manipulation thus assist managers to meet their earnings target, but do not certainly 
add to the value of the firm. Table 2.1 shows the summary of some past global corporate 
scandals that were connected to accruals or real activities manipulation.
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Table 2.1: Past Corporate Scandals Connected to Earnings Management
Company EM Public
Announcement
Date
Allegations
Adelphia
Communications
AM April 2002 The company overstated financial results by inflating capital expenses and hide debt. In 
addition, the founding family collected $3.1 billion in off-balance-sheet loans in the 
company’s name.
AOL Time Warner RA July 2002 As AOL’s purchase o f Time Warner loomed, AOL inflated revenue by booking barter 
deals and ads it sold on behalf o f companies as revenue to keep its growth rate up in order 
to seal the merger deal. The company also boosted revenue via “round-trip” deals with 
advertisers and suppliers.
Bristol-Myers
Squibb
RA July 2002 The company inflated its revenue by $1.5 billion in 2001 by “channel stuffing,” that is 
forcing wholesalers to accept more inventory than they can sell to get it off the 
manufacturer’s books
Enron AM October 2001 Enron boosted profits and hide debts totaling over $1 billion by improperly using off- 
balance-sheet partnerships; manipulated the Texas power market; bribed foreign 
governments to win contracts abroad and manipulated California energy market
Halliburton AM May 2002 Halliburton improperly recognized revenue o f $100 million in annual construction cost 
overrun in their financial statements before customers agreed to pay for them.
Homestore.com RA January 2002 The company inflated revenue by booking barter transactions as revenue.
Kmart AM/RA January 2002 Anonymous letters from people claiming to be Kmart employees alleged that the 
company’s accounting practices intended to mislead investors about its financial health.
Mirant RA July 2002 The company said it may have overstated various assets and liabilities. An internal review 
revealed errors that may have inflated revenue by $1.1 billion.
Nicor Energy RA July 2002 Independent audit investigation uncovered accounting problems that increased revenue and 
underestimated expenses.
Tyco RA May 2002 Ex-CEO Tyco was indicted for tax evasion. The Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) investigated mismanagement o f company funds, related-party transactions and 
improper merger accounting practices.
Merck RA July 2002 Merck recorded fictitious revenue of $12.4 billion in consumer-to-pharmacy “co­
payments”. As a result, Merck withdrew the registered initial public offer (IPO) application 
filed with SEC which was expected to raise $1 billion.
Source: Forbes (20 )2) - The Corporate Scandal S teet.
E M - Earnings management. RA — Real activities manipulation. AM -Accruals manipulation.
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2.2 Related Research
Previous literature mainly covers four areas namely: (i) Agency conflict, (ii) ownership 
structure, (iii) restatement of financial statements and (iv) quality of financial statements to 
explain earnings management. The following discussion includes some of the major findings 
related to these four core areas.
2.2.1 Agency Conflict
The analytical framework of earnings management studies is derived from Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) when the theory of the firm was proposed. The authors state that the 
relationship between the executive managers and the shareholders is an agent and principal 
relationship. Jensen and Meckling (1976) describe an agency relationship as a contract under 
which the principal (business owner) engages the agent (manager) to perform some services on 
its behalf. “Due to the separation of business ownership from control, the principal delegate 
some decision making authorities to the agent in order to achieve the primary objective of the 
firm, which is the maximization of shareholders wealth” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 5).
However, the wealth-maximization objective of the firm conflicts with the interest of the 
managers (profit maximization) that spurs earnings to be managed. In order to control the 
activities of the managers towards optimal decision making that actualizes the value 
maximization objective of the firm, agency costs surface. These costs are:
(1) Monitoring Costs: These are expenditures paid by the principal to measure, 
observe and control the agent’s behaviour. They may include the costs of audits, 
writing executive compensation contracts and ultimately the cost of firing managers;
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(2) Bond Cost: is the cost relating to setting up structures that will see managers act 
in the shareholders’ best interest, or compensate them (shareholders) accordingly if 
managers do not;
(3) Residual Loss: arise because the cost of fully enforcing the principal-agent 
contracts would far outweigh the benefits derived from it (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976, 5-6).
In spite of the agency costs, earnings management still persists through various forms of 
share ownership as detailed below.
2.2.2 Earnings Management and Ownership Structure
Ownership structure is an internal control system exercised over a firm management team 
(Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca, 2013). Apart from other firm level factors which influence earnings 
management, firm’s board formation and composition structure could also provide an 
opportunistic platform for managers to engage in behaviors that are self-serving. Well 
formulated ownership structures give a monitoring power to the activities of the corporate board. 
In addition, governance literature has documented earnings manipulation as a result of ownership 
structure. Specifically, Wang (2006) find relationships between ownership structure and 
discretionary accruals. Meanwhile, some common ownership structures operating in various 
firms and their effect on earnings management are highlighted below:
2.2.2.1 Family Ownership
There are two main arguments in the literature related to family ownership. Firstly, 
family ownership is related to the concentration of ownership in the hands of wealthy family 
members. Normally, such ownership structure is entrusted with a life time reputation built from
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generation to generation. As an illustration, Wang (2006), and Ali et al. (2007) believe family 
ownership raises concerns about good reputation and therefore discourages earnings 
manipulation. This means that family firms act in ways that maximize the wealth of firm in the 
long run rather than managing earnings for short term benefit.
Secondly, Rabelo and Coutinho (2001) and Bona, Perez and Santana (2008) argue that 
high family concentration exerts a decisive influence on the control of firms. Part of this 
influence includes non-voting rights which are issued to the owners. “Such voting rights 
implicitly give greater incentives for the controlling shareholders (families) to obtain private 
benefits which result in potential increases in earnings management” (Gonzalez et al. 2013, 
p422).
2.2.2.2 Managerial Ownership
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Healy (1985), amongst other previous studies on agency 
theory, emphasize that a lack of managers’ equity ownership in the firms they manage might 
ignite self-interest behaviour in ways that are far from maximizing firm values. Conversely, 
managerial ownership allows the alignment of managers’ personal self-interest objectives with 
the wealth maximization objective of the firm. However, Isenmila and Afensimi (2012) are of 
the view that high managerial ownership encourages managerial discretionary behavior. In 
addition, Hsu and Koh (2005) document a positive association between income-decreasing 
discretionary accruals and managerial ownership. In a study of South American firms, Gonzalez 
et al. (2013) document a non-linear relationship between internal ownership and discretionary 
accruals. The non-linear relationship suggests that managerial ownership limits discretionary 
behaviour when their share ownership is not very high. In the contrast, Machuga and Teitel
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(2009) point out that firms’ with less internal (managerial) ownership tend to show a greater 
earnings quality (less manipulative practices by managers) compared to firms with no managerial 
ownership.
2.2.2.3 Institutional Ownership
Institutional investors are sophisticated investors who control managerial discretion 
(Ferreira and Matos, 2008). Koh (2003) believes that there are two opposing views of 
institutional ownership that affects managers’ financial reporting discretion. The author affirms 
that the activities of short-term oriented (passive) institutional shareholding encourage managers’ 
irrational behaviour. Short-term oriented investors exhibit a strong desire for short-term (current) 
earnings which render a misleading economic performance of the firm (Koh, 2003). On the other 
hand, active involvement of long-term oriented institutional shareholders limits managerial 
incentives to adopt aggressive earnings management and opportunistic behaviour in general 
(Koh, 2003). Meanwhile, Gonzalez et al. (2013) find a negative relationship between 
institutional ownership and discretionary accruals. This supports a notion that higher institutional 
ownership discourages earnings management and has a positive impact on corporate behaviour.
2.2.2.4 External Block Ownership
The external block ownership structure mostly comprise of individual shareholders 
(Isenmila and Elijah, 2012). The individual shareholding can either be held by small block- 
holders who own a small fraction of the share ownership and cannot assert control on the 
managers, or large block-holders, who have a strong desire to actively monitor the performance 
of the managers of firms. Still, Dechow et al. (1996) affirm that large block-holders usually act 
strategically in a way that assert pressure on the managers to report a certain level of favorable
financial performance on the one hand, and a threat to take over the management for poor 
performance on the other hand. The existence of large block-holders therefore may encourage 
managers to engage in income-increasing earnings management. However, Isenmila et al. (2012) 
find a positive and significant relationship between external block ownership and earnings 
management.
From the above background, this study is of the view that both internal and external share 
ownership affects the level of discretionary behaviour of managers in Nigerian firms and expects 
that:
H]i There is a significant impact of Corporate Ownership Structure on earnings 
management.
2.2.3 Quality of Financial Reporting Perspective
Verleun et al. (2011) believe there is no specific definition as to what constitutes 
accounting quality. However, Barth, Landsman, and Lang (2008) state that the financial 
statements that is more value relevant usually reflect losses on a timelier basis as being of higher 
accounting quality. Meanwhile, Ashbaugh and Pincus, (2001) are of the view that the quality of 
financial statements increases when managers’ opportunistic discretion in determining financial 
accounting numbers are limited.
However, the introduction and application of common regulations like the International 
Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) by the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) 
and the Sarbanes Oxley Act are aimed at increasing accounting quality that better reflect the true 
economic position of firms. Many countries including Nigeria have adopted these regulations. In
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contrast, Barth et al. (2008) indicate that the inherent flexibility in principle-based standards 
(IASs/IFRSs) could provide opportunities for firms to manage earnings. The disadvantage of this 
is that it can decrease accounting quality. In addition, the effect of the features in the financial 
reporting system (other than the standards themselves) could eliminate any improvement in 
accounting quality arising from adopting IAS/IFRS.
In order to test this hypothesis, the study need a measure of the quality of financial 
reporting which will serve as the independent variable in the regression model. From previous 
studies it is clear that financial statement quality has many attributes. Financial reporting quality 
can be measured in many different ways and each proxy has its own qualities and limitations. 
Examples of such proxy is the level of earnings’ management (Leuz et al. 2003) and the 
timeliness in recognizing economic income in reported earnings (Ball, Robin and Wu, 2003). 
However, in this study, the determinant of the financial reporting quality for Nigerian firms is the 
aggregate score of the discretionary accrual values and as a result, this study predicts that:
H2: The higher/lower the level of discretionary accruals the lower/higher the quality of 
financial reporting of firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange.
2.2.4 Financial Accounting Restatement Perspective
Bardos (2011) believe that restatement corrects past errors in financial accounts. 
Moreover, restatement could be seen as improving the quality of financial reporting. 
Consequently, accounting restatements have a negative impact on the credibility of the board and 
management of the firm. In turn, doubting the integrity of financial reports could have negative 
returns on stock prices (Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz, 2004). Information on accounting
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restatement is usually perceived as “negative” depending on the materiality of adjustments 
required. Prior research on accounting restatements has documented diverse features and 
consequences such restatements could have on the wealth maximization objective of the firm. 
For instance, Hribar and Jenkins (2004) and Palmrose et al. (2004) document an immediate 
increase in the cost of equity capital and a significant loss in market value following accounting 
restatement announcements.
Finally, Chen, Cheng, and Lo (2012) elaborate on the impact of accounting restatement 
on firms’ external financing choices. The authors state that the credibility of financial reporting 
is lower after restatement announcements due to perceived information asymmetry. 
Consequently, firms that have had material financial accounting restatements in their financial 
reports experience a proportional increase in external debt by 11 percent because the 
restatements send a negative signal to the equity market (Chen et al. 2012). Accordingly, these 
results are consistent with material restatements leading to more serious doubts among investors 
regarding the quality of financial reporting. On these instances, this study justifies the inclusion 
of debt financing (leverage) in the model for analysis and predicts that:
H3 : Debt financing is positively associated with the likelihood of financial accounting 
restatements.
20
2.3 Earnings Management and Firm Characteristics
2.3.1 Firm Size
Kim, Liu and Rhee (2003) believe there are three opposing views on the role of firm size 
in earnings management as reported by Burgstahler et al. (1997). Firstly, Kim et al. (2003) are of 
the view that the larger the firm size, the lower the chance of earnings management and vice 
versa. The authors suggest that large firms have more sophisticated internal control mechanism, 
and thus it is difficult for these firms to manipulate reported earnings. This is because more 
structured internal control mechanisms include an audit committee, reliable financial information 
disclosure, and a dynamic board structure that is more independent from the management. This 
type of internal control is more visible in large firms compared to small firms. In this instance, 
large firms are more likely to have a well-structured and also maintain highly effective internal 
control systems that reduce the likelihood of earnings management in comparison to small firms.
Secondly, large firms have already evolved into a brand built over time to maintain their 
status as “big firms”. Meanwhile, small firms are still evolving with increased propensity to 
manipulate their reported earnings over time. With this notion, large firms are audited by 
auditors from one of the big six auditing firms that have more reputation and experience to 
prevent financial misrepresentation. In understanding the economics of audit choices, Francis, 
Maydew and Sparks (1999) document that big six accounting firms are viewed as quality 
differentiated auditors due to increased credibility given to reported earnings and their ability to 
constrain aggressive and potentially opportunistic reporting. Francis et al. (1999) affirm that 
firms with international (big six) auditors have the smallest discretionary accruals (13.7 percent). 
This is followed by firms with second-tier national auditors (17.2 percent), and then firm with 
third-tier local auditors (22.1 percent). In addition, the authors’ final results show a smaller
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discretionary accruals value o f 19.2 percent for big six audited firms compared to 29.3 percent 
for firms with non-big six audited firms. Nelson, Elliot and Tarpley (2002) document auditor’s 
significance in reducing earnings management. The authors find that auditors are more likely to 
waive earnings management attempts that they consider immaterial or are attempted by large 
clients.
Thirdly, large firms take reputation costs into perspective when engaging in earnings 
management compared to small firms (Kim et al. 2003). The authors believe that large firms 
have strong understanding of their market environment, more established corporate social 
responsibilities, including credibility of financial information compared to small firms. 
Therefore, concern about reputation may prevent large firms from manipulating earnings 
compared to small firms. Also, the cost of engaging in earnings management will be higher for 
large firms than small firms. Finally, large firms may be less likely to manage earnings relative 
to smaller counterparts because they are followed by more financial analysts (Kim et al. 2003).
There are however contrasting views that large firms are more likely to manage reported 
earnings than their small firm counterparts. Firstly, Barton and Simko (2002) argue that large 
firms face more pressure to surpass analysts' earnings expectations/forecasts. The pressure is due 
to the fact that investors are quick to sell off their shares of firms that fail to meet or surpass 
analysts’ earnings expectations (Skinner and Sloan, 2001). Secondly, the reputation and size of 
firms give certain bargaining power. Kim et al. (2003) infer that large firms have greater 
bargaining power with auditors. This means that the larger their sizes, the more bargaining power 
they have while negotiating with auditors and this may result in high chance of earnings 
management.
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Finally, Kim et al. (2003) indicate that because large firms have stronger management 
power and more dynamism, management may override the internal control system to manipulate 
earnings to exceed earnings thresholds. In addition, large firms may choose to manage the 
reported earnings to decrease political costs (Kim et al. 2003). In all these cases, the incentives 
and abilities to manage earnings may vary among firms of different sizes. However, these 
competing views and evidence raised a question on the relation of earnings management to firm 
size with respect to Nigerian firms listed on the nation’s stock exchange. Meanwhile, from the 
above argument, some of the sampled firms in this study have international affiliation with high 
bargaining power and large volume of stocks being traded on the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
(NSE). These firms are not only dominant in Nigeria but also across the whole of West African 
sub region. Hence the study hypothesizes that:
H4 : Firm size is negatively related to earnings management.
2.3.2 Debt Covenants (Leverage)
Firms enter into debt covenants (borrowing cash) to finance their operations (Doron and 
Penman 2003). DeFond (1994) argues that debt covenants are intended to confine managers from 
engaging in investment and financing decisions that reduce the value of debt holders claims. 
Specifically, debt covenants may restrict the payment of dividends at certain income levels 
(Nelson and George 2013). In addition, the literature link debt and accounting policy choice 
together because debt covenants are usually based on reported accounting numbers and a 
violation of the debt covenants leads to extra costs on the company (Nelson et al. 2013). Watts 
and Zimmerman (1986) note that firms that are near violation of the debt covenants make 
accounting choices that lower the likelihood of default. However, Sweeney (1994) test the
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hypothesis that firms that default on their debt obligations change to more liberal accounting 
procedures in the five years before default (more frequently than comparable firms that do not 
default). In addition, Sweeney (1994) provides a direct test of the proposition that managers 
change accounting procedures in response to tightening debt covenants constraints. The author 
also finds that managers of firms that are approaching violation of accounting-based restrictions 
are more likely to make income-increasing discretionary accounting changes. Furthermore, such 
firms also adopt income-increasing accounting changes earlier than control firms-matched on 
industry, firm size, and time period.
Consequently, managers choose income-increasing accounting policies to reduce the 
probability of debt covenants violation and to improve the firm's bargaining power during debt 
negotiation (Norman and Kamran, 2005). This is an indication that the direction o f earnings 
management relating to leverage can either be upward or downward. For instance, DeFond and 
Jiambalvo (1994) detect income-increasing discretionary accruals in financially distressed firms 
to avoid debt violation. Furthermore, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1994) find income-decreasing 
abnormal accruals to obtain better terms in contract renegotiation. In estimating the impact of 
debt covenants, related literature has frequently used leverage as a proxy for the existence of a 
relationship with earnings management (DeFond et al. 1994). In case of Nigerian firms, due to 
incentives plan mostly dividend covenant to shareholders, firms are more willing to borrow in 
order to fulfil this purpose. In this regard, the study is of the opinion that:
H5: A positive relationship exists between debt covenant and earnings management.
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2.3.3 Growth in Earnings
Persistent growth in earnings could be an indication of extreme financial performance. It 
is observed that CEOs of firms are focused on maintaining steadily increasing earnings. For 
example, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) state that managers try to maintain a pattern of 
increasing earnings. However, Barth, Elliot and Finn (1995) report that firms with a consistent 
pattern of earnings growth gain higher premiums on the price-to-eamings (P/E) ratio, after 
controlling for earnings levels. Additionally, the authors find that the (P/E) ratio is massively 
higher for a longer series of earnings increases and substantially reduced when the established 
incremental pattern of earnings is finally broken. DeAngelo et al. (1996) documents that firm 
breaking a pattern of consistent earnings growth experience an average of 14 percent negative 
abnormal stock return in the year the pattern is broken. Meanwhile, it is expected that firms with 
rapid growth in earnings experience larger accruals (McNichols, 2000). For instance, in relation 
between initial public offering (IPO) underpricing and post-IPO growth rates of accounting 
performance variables, Zheng and Stangeland (2007) find that underpricing is positively related 
to growth in sales and operating income before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization 
expenses (EBITDA) in the five years succeeding an IPO.
In other related literature, Balachandran and Mohanram (2009) highlight different ways 
in which firms can display growth in earnings. These include: First, by making additional 
investments in projects that deliver positive earnings in the fixture (investment-driven growth). In 
this regard, earnings can also be inflated by improving operating efficiencies, reducing costs and 
using pricing power to internalize economic rents (internally generated growth). Second, 
generating growth internally by increasing profitability of existing assets is always valuable, 
while growth from investment may or may not create value, depending on the rate of return on
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incremental investment. Further, the authors find both internally generated growth and 
investment-driven growth to be positively associated with CEO compensation (Balachandran et 
al. 2009); hence, a possible earnings management can be done due to managers’ own personal 
benefit.
McNichols (2000) documents a significant positive correlation between discretionary and 
non-discretionary estimates of accruals and growth in earnings. These findings indicate that 
growth firms are likely to exhibit positive discretionary estimates, and that a comparison of their 
estimated discretionary accruals to other firms with lower growth can lead to a conclusion of 
greater earnings management. From this affirmation, the study states this hypothesis:
Hfi: Growth in earnings is positively related to discretionary accruals (earnings 
management).
2.3.4 Return on Company’s Assets (ROA) -  Firms Economic Performance
Managers are motivated by incentives to prove their level of efficiency in using firm’s 
assets to maximize shareholders’ wealth (Kasznik, 1999). For Instance, Myers and Skinner 
(2007) find that firms with positive prior year’s earnings influence managers’ susceptibility to 
inflate future year’s earnings to keep pace with prior years’ trend, in addition to meeting 
analysts’ future earnings forecast. Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) argue that the discretionary 
accruals behaviors of firms are influenced by three different kinds of events. First, discretionary 
accruals are influenced by planned corporate events of interest. Second, discretionary accruals 
are induced by other firm-specific events. And third, performance motivated discretionary 
accruals such as improving ROA. Kothari et al. (2005) also opine that firms with high ROA will
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have more o f other firm-specific events and performance motivated discretionary accruals than 
others. Following the above argument, Shih (2013) refers to the two kinds of abnormal accruals 
collectively as performance-related abnormal accruals. However, since returns on assets (ROA) 
is capable of capturing the effect o f firms’ operating performance (Zhijian, 2012) ROA is 
selected in this study as opposed to the use of firms’ share prices to denote firm performance. 
Following the above arguments, the study therefore hypothesizes that:
H7: Return on Assets has a positive relationship with earnings management.
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Chapter Three: Data and Methodology
This chapter discusses empirical models, measurement of key variables and analysis. The 
chapter is divided into two sections. Section 3.1 covers the methodology for calculating 
discretionary and non-discretionary accruals, and section 3.2 explains database for the analysis.
3.1 Methodology
In consistent with Dechow et al. (1995) and other prior literatures of earnings 
management, total accruals (TACC) scaled by lagged total assets are computed using equations
3.1.1 below:
TACC, = (ACAt - ACLt - ACash, + ASTDt -  Pep,)
A,., (3.1.1)
Where:
TACCt = Total accruals.
ACAt = Change in current assets.
ACLt ~ Change in current liabilities.
ACasht = Change in cash and cash equivalents.
ASTDt = Change in debt included in current liabilities.
Dept = Depreciation and amortization expense.
Am = Total assets in year t-1.
However, empirical literatures have applied different non-discretionary accruals models 
to determine the discretionary accruals used as proxy for estimating earnings management 
hypothesis. Hence, non-discretionary accruals are calculated using the following models:
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i. The Healy Model
This is the earliest nondiscretionary accruals model that is used to measure the level of 
earnings management. In the model, Healy (1985) uses total accruals (discretionary and non- 
discretionary)1 as a proxy to predict systematic earnings management and finds that earnings 
management occurs both in the event period2 when earnings management is believed to have 
been carried out and also in the estimation period3 when no earnings management has occurred. 
The author assumed that the estimated nondiscretionary accruals as represented below are 
constant overtime.
NDA. = SrTAt (3.1.2)
T
Where:
NDAt = Estimated non-discretionary accruals.
TAt= Total accruals scaled by lagged total assets.
T = A year subscript for a year in the event period.
T= A year subscript for years included in the estimation period.
ii. The DeAngelo Model
DeAngelo (1986) model of nondiscretionary accruals assume total accruals as non­
discretionary accruals. In this case, the lagged total accruals are scaled by total assets to calculate 
non-discretionary accruals as shown below:
Non-discretionary Accruals (t) = Total Accruals, n (3.1.3)
Total Assetst
1 Discretionary accruals are adjustments to cash flows chosen from opportunity set of generally accepted accounting 
procedures as stipulated by the standard setting bodies while Non-discretionary accruals are accounting adjustments 
to firm’s cash flows as dictated by accounting standard setting bodies (Healy, 1985, p.89).
2 The period in which earnings management took place (Healy, 1985).
3 Estimation period is the period in which earnings management did not occur (Healy, 1985).
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iii. The Jones Model
Jones (1991) proposed an expectations model for non-discretionary total accruals, which 
controls for change in economic circumstances of firms such as revenue, gross property, plant 
and equipment and total assets in the event year as stated in equation 3.1.4.
NDA, = a , (1 / A,.,) + a 2 (AREV,/ A,.,) + a3 (PPEt / A,.j) (3.1.4)
Where:
NDAt = Estimated non-discretionary accruals.
At.i= Total assets in year t-1.
AREVt = Change in net revenue of firms in year t less net revenue in year t-1 scaled by 
total assets in year t-1.
PPEt = Gross property, plant and equipment of firms in year t.
The model incorporates firms’ revenue (REV), and property, plant and equipment (PPE) 
scaled by total assets (TA) on the assumption that managerial discretion is not exercisable on 
sales either in the estimation period or the event period (Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney, 1995).
iv. The Modified Jones Model
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) proposed an identical modification to the original 
Jones (1991) model. Dechow et al. (1995) assumed that the changes in receivables (AREC) in the 
event period is as a result of earnings manipulation. Discretions are easily exercisable on cash 
receivables than it is on cash sales and thus sales should be netted off fictitious revenue. In this 
regard, a modified version of the earlier Jones model is proposed in equation 3.1.5.
NDA, = a, (1 / A,.,) + a2 (AREV, - AREC,) / A,., + «3 (PPE, / A,.,) (3.1.5)
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Where:
At.i= Lagged total assets i.e. total assets in year t-1.
AREVt = Revenue in year t less revenue in year t-1 scaled by total asset in year t-1.
ARECt = Receivable in year t less receivable in year t-1 scaled by total asset in year t-1.
PPEt = Gross property plant and equipment in year t scaled by total assets in year t-1.
Oli, & 2  and a 3 = OLS estimates of corresponding variables that are obtained using the 
standard Jones (1991) model.
Further, Dechow et al. (1995) believe that the modified Jones model is more successful in 
explaining the variations in accruals because of the model’s smaller standard error.
v. The Kothari and Wasley Model
A “performance-matched” approach of deriving discretionary accruals model was 
proposed by Kothari and Wasley in 2005. This approach provides additional controls for what is 
considered “normal” earnings management. Performances are matched on the basis of firms 
current and past year’s return on assets (ROAt and ROA,.i). Kothari et al. (2005) state that test of 
discretionary accruals using performance-matched approach is better specified than using a 
linear regression approach. The authors performance matched model is similar to the Jones and 
modified Jones model except that it is augmented to include (ROA, or ROA,./) as shown in 
equation 3.1.6.
TAt = Cli (1 / Am) + a 2 (ASALES,) + a 3 (PPEt) + d4 ROA, (or ROA,.i) + V, (3.1.6)
31
Where:
TAt = Total accruals in year t of the firms.
Am = Total assets in year t-1 of the firms.
ASALES, = Change in sales in year t of the firms.
PPEt = Gross property, plant, and equipment in year t of the firms.
ROAt (or ROAm) = Return on assets in time t or t-1 of the firms.
Vt = The residual.
Kothari et al. (2005) find that the augmentation of the modified Jones model with the 
performance-matched technique yielded a small chance of misspecification error compared to 
the traditional modified Jones model that suffer from “severe-misspecification” error.
However, the non-discretionary accruals calculated from the above models were 
subtracted from the total accruals calculated in equation 3.1.1 above to obtain the discretionary 
accruals for all firms (DA = TACC -  NDA). In addition, after the calculation of the discretionary 
accruals, an equation that shows the magnitude of earnings management of 62 firms listed on the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) was estimated in Eviews 8 using the model stated below in 
equation 3.1.7:
DAit = /J0  + ^.GROWTH,, + /?2LEVlt + &FIRM SIZE* + /?,ROAlt + /JJNSTit +ptCEO,, 
+ /?,CHAIR„+/JJNDVit+/J9D2 + /?1oDJ + £u (3.1.7)
Where:
DAjt = Discretionary accruals calculated from the five models.
GROWTHjt = Growth in earnings is measured as change in revenue divided by revenue
in year t-1 in percentage.
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LEVit = Debt ratio, measured as firms total debt divided by total assets in year t.
FIRM SIZE;t = Firm size is represented by log of total assets in year t.
ROAjt = Earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets of firms in year t.
INSTj, = Percentage of institutional ownership of sample firms in year t.
CEO* = Percentage of CEO ownership of sample firms in year t.
CHAIRi, = Percentage of chairman ownership of sample firms in year t.
INDVit = Percentage of individual ownership of sample firms in year t.
D, (Consumer Goods Industry) = A dummy variable that equals 1 for firms that belong to 
consumer staples and discretionary subsector of the Nigerian economy and 0 if otherwise. 
This is a base dummy omitted from the model to avoid the problem of dummy trap.
D2 (Manufacturing Industry) = A dummy variable that equals 1 for firms that belong to 
industrial, material and energy subsector of the Nigerian economy and 0 if otherwise.
D3 (Service Industry) = A dummy variable that equals 1 for firms that belong to financial 
services, healthcare and telecommunications subsector of the Nigerian economy and 0 if 
otherwise.
f } \  /?io = Estimated model parameters.
3.2 Database
The focus of this investigation is based on all publicly listed firms on Nigerian Stock 
Exchange (NSE) whose data are available for all the variables used in the study for the sample 
period. Data are collected from both CAPITALIQ and CRSP/COMPUSTAT (The Centre for
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Research in Security Prices) database published by Standard and Poor (S&P). All financial 
information required for the calculation of the dependent variable (discretionary accruals) value 
using all the models above was obtained for 10 years period (2003-2012). The panel dataset 
contains 62 firms representing 32 percent of total listed firms on the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
(NSE) for the period of 2003-2012 in local currency, which is the Nigerian naira (N). The 
balance dataset therefore includes 620 firm-year observations.
Missing data is a common issue for any emerging country like Nigeria and that can have 
a significant effect on the conclusions drawn from existing dataset. However, missing data 
reduces the generalization of the sample dataset and therefore distort inferences about the 
population. Rather than excluding firms with missing data in any one year, interpolation using 
trends is used to generate such missing data for any of the 62 firms for the observed period of 
2003-2012, thus given 620 firm-year observations.
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Chapter Four: Empirical Results and Analysis
This chapter discusses the findings from our estimated models of earnings management 
using publicly listed firms on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) for the period 2003-2012. The 
chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.1 discusses the descriptive statistics of variables used 
in the regression analysis. Section 4.2 provides correlation analysis among the independent 
variables. Section 4.3 discusses the regression results from five discretionary accruals models to 
address the research questions and hypotheses.
4.1 Variables Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.1 reports the values of the mean and standard deviation of individual key 
variables that are used in the regression models. Since the study uses five different discretionary 
accruals models to estimate the level of earnings management among Nigerian firms, the table 
includes summary statistics for each of them including firm characteristics and ownership 
variables included in the models.
There is, however, significant variation in size across the sample as represented by the 
minimum and maximum values and standard deviations. The study finds that the average firm 
size in the analysis as represented by FIRM SIZE range from 6.28 to 13.15 during the observed 
period, and it implies that these are some large companies in the cohort o f companies. In fact, the 
average total assets of the observed firms is N57.97 billion, ranging in W537 million and N515 
billion. The average growth in future earnings among the Nigerian firms ranges from -0.43 
percent to the highest growth rate of 229 percent. This financial performance of the firms shows 
that some firms are performing well and growing faster. Findings also show that management of 
the firms uses the firms’ assets efficiently as mean ROA is 6.93 percent, ranging from -13
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percent to 19 percent. Furthermore, in the case of leverage (LEV), we find that Nigerian firms 
are highly levered on the average at 73.83 percent indicating that the firms are more dependent 
on borrowing to finance their assets. Meanwhile, the data points for firm size, leverage and 
return on assets tend to be low and close to the mean as indicated by their standard deviation of 
2.03, 1.75 and 0.08, respectively.
Additionally, the study documents that the ownership structure across the firms is 
dominated by individual shareholding as average share ownership is 14.87 percent largest 
proportion among all other types of ownership. Likewise, Chairman, Institutional and CEO 
shareholdings across sample firms vary in between 0 and 25 percent, between 2 percent and 28 
percent, and between 0 percent and 25 percent, respectively. Importantly, the estimated level of 
discretionary accruals also differs from model to model. The study finds that the absolute 
discretionary accruals using the Jones and modified Jones model is, on average 17.74 percent 
and 18.20 percent, respectively. Further, the standard deviation of Jones (modified Jones) model 
is 73.37 (79.98), indicating that the models discretionary accruals are highly dispersed and 
spread out over a large range of values. Likewise, the result states that the mean of absolute 
discretionary accruals using Healy (1985), DeAngelo (1986) and Kothari et al. (2005) models to 
be 0.96 percent, 0.97 percent and 5.02 percent, respectively. The data points for Healy (1985), 
DeAngelo (1986) and Kothari et al. (2005) models are less dispersed from their respective mean 
with standard deviation of 4.52,4.59 and 15.49, respectively.
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Table 4.1: Variables Descriptive Statistics
Variables Discretionary Accruals Firm Characteristics
Mean Min Max S.D Skewness Mean Min Max S.D Skewness
DAJ -17.74 -337 -0.86 73.37 -4.24 GROWTH 11.19 -0.43 229.23 49.96 4.24
DAMJ -18.20 -367 0.02 79.98 -4.24 LEV 0.73 -0.21 6.03 1.75 2.62
DAH 0.96 -0.34 20.68 4.52 4.24 FIRM
SIZE
8.68 6.28 13.15 2.03 1.08
DADA 0.97 -0.35 21.01 4.59 4.24 ROA 0.06 -0.13 0.19 0.08 -0.55
DAK -5.02 -72.64 -1.36 15.49 -4.24 TOTAL
ASSET
57966 537.93 515063 138138 2.59
Ownership Variables
Mean Min Max S.D Skewness
INST 8.68 1.88 28.32 5.89 1.82
CEO 6.05 0.00 25.09 10.90 1.22
CHAIR 10.11 0.00 25.09 10.18 0.60
INDV 14.87 0.07 41.65 15.74 0.92
Note: DAJ -  Jones model discretionary accruals. DAMJ -  Modified Jones model discretionary accruals. DAH — Healy model 
discretionary accruals. DADA -  DeAngelo model discretionary accruals. DAK -  Kothari et al. model discretionary accruals. 
GROWTH -  Growth in earnings. L E V - Debt to asset ratio. FIRM SIZE -  Log o f total assets representing firm size. ROA — Return on 
assets. TOTAL ASSET -  Firm’s total assets. INST -  Institutional ownership. CEO — CEO ownership. CHAIR -  Chairman ownership. 
IND V- Individual ownership.
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4.2 Correlation Coefficient
Table 4.2 shows the correlation coefficient of the variables included in the regression 
equation. Growth in earnings (GROWTH) is highly correlated with the five discretionary 
accruals except with discretionary accruals calculated with Kothari et al. (2005) model. In 
contrast, other independent variables are not highly correlated to DAK in most cases. For 
instance, while firm’s leverage and profitability is positively correlated with DAK at the 10 
percent level (0.024 and 0.039, respectively), FIRM SIZE is negatively correlated with DAK at 
the 5 percent level. This suggests that high bank borrowing and profitability increase earnings 
management whereas large firms expose to low volume of earnings management in Nigeria.
Furthermore, the firms’ total assets (TOTAL ASSETS) are fairly correlated with 
discretionary accruals. The correlation between these variables is highly significant at 0.01 and
0.05 levels, respectively, but insignificant in the case of DAH and DADA. In general, it 
repeatedly suggests that large firms with high assets base have low magnitude of discretionary 
accruals. Likewise, firm size is negatively correlated with discretionary accruals. For instance, 
the correlation between FIRM SIZE and DAK is -0.474, significant at the 5 percent level. Few 
independent variables are highly uncorrelated with each other such as TOTAL ASSETS and 
FIRM SIZE and leverage (LEV) and CEO ownership; though statistically, while return on assets 
(ROA) and Chairman Shareholding, and ROA and Individual shareholding are significantly 
correlated.
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Table 4.2: Correlation Coefficient Matrix
DAJ DAMJ DAH DADA DAK GROWTH LEV
FIRM
SIZE ROA
TOTAL
ASSET INST CEO CHAIR INDV
DAJ 1.000
DAMJ 1.000 1.000
DAH -0.999** -0.999** 1.000
DADA -0.999** -0.999** 1.000 1.000
DAK 0.999* 0.999* -0.999** -0.999** 1.000
GROWTH -0.999** -0.999** 0.999* 0.999* -0.999 1.000
LEV 0.027** 0.026** -0.031* -0.031* 0.024* -0.020* 1.000
FIRM
SIZE -0.473** -0.474** 0.468 0.468 -0.474** 0.473 -0.023** 1.000
ROA 0.034* 0.034* -0.022** -0.022** 0.039* -0.033* -0.230** -0.407** 1.000
TOTAL
ASSET -0.568** -0.568** 0.566 0.566 -0.566** 0.567 -0.062** 0.833 -0.087** 1.000
INST 0.118 0.118 -0.117** -0.117** 0.120 -0.119** -0.229** -0.316** 0.162 -0.309** 1.000
CEO 0.122 0.122 -0.125** -0.125** 0.115 -0.119** 0.594 -0.103** -0.471** -0.224** -0.334** 1.000
CHAIR 0.227 0.226 -0.234** -0.234** 0.220 -0.224** 0.488 -0.035** -0.678** -0.327** -0.051** 0.841 1.000
INDV 0.185 0.185 -0.191** -0.191** 0.179 -0.183** 0.560 -0.093** -0.612** -0.309** -0.149** 0.944 0.969 1.000
** Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (2 tailed) * Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level (2 tailed)
Note: DAJ - Jones model discretionary accruals. DAMJ - Modified Jones model discretionary accruals. DAH - Healy model 
discretionary accruals. DADA - DeAngelo model discretionary accruals. DAK- Kothari et al. model discretionary accruals. 
GROWTH - Growth in earnings. LEV - Debt to asset ratio. FIRM SIZE - Log o f total asset representing firm size. ROA - Return on 
assets. TOTAL ASSET - Firms net worth. INST - Institutional ownership. CEO - CEO ownership. CHAIR - Chairman ownership. 
INDV - Individual ownership.
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4.3 Estimated Regression Results
4.3.1 Results Pertaining to Research Question 1 -  The Best Estimation Model of
Discretionary Accruals in Nigerian
The classical assumptions must be met in order for ordinary least square (OLS) 
estimators to be the best available (Studenmund, 2011, p.93). The author describes the classical 
regression assumptions as a set of fairly basic assumptions required to hold in order for OLS 
coefficients to be considered the best estimators in regression models. The following classical 
assumptions have been used in selecting the best regression model out of the five models in this 
study that best explain earnings management of listed firms in Nigeria:
i. R-squared should be high and at least more than 50 percent.
ii. Overall fitness and significance of the model (p-value of F statistics).
iii. No Serial/Autocorrelation in the residuals.
iv. No Heteroskedasticity in the residuals.
v. Residuals are normally distributed.
The model that fulfills all the above listed features will be recommended as the best 
earnings management regression model for listed firms in Nigeria. The acceptance of the null 
hypothesis with significant p-value at 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively for criteria (ii) 
to (v) is desirable for the best model decision. From table 4.3, the study finds that the R-square 
differs from model to model and is not well fitted in most cases. From 2.3 percent under the 
modified Jones (1995) model, the relative R-squared improves to 16 percent [30.7 percent] in the 
case of Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986) models [Jones, 1991 model]. In addition, in Kothari 
et al. (2005) model, the estimated R-square is 52.2 percent - the largest among all the other 
model specifications.
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This study tests for the predictive power of the entire model using the F statistic. The 
overall fitness of the accrual model is significant at 5 percent level, under Jones (1991), modified 
Jones (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005) model. This shows that the independent variables can 
jointly influence the level of discretionary accruals among listed firms in Nigeria under these 
three models as indicated by their p-values respectively. It can be concluded that the Kothari et 
al. (2005) model does indeed have the best significance of overall fit with p-value of 0.000.
Furthermore, a good regression model should not have error term that is serially 
correlated with each other in the sample period. Importantly, if a systematic correlation does 
exist between one error term and another in a time series data, then it will be more difficult for 
OLS to get accurate estimates of the standard errors of the coefficients (Studenmund, 2011). As a 
result, the residual diagnostics as shown by the corresponding p-value of the observed R-squared 
of Breusch Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test indicate that Healy (1985), DeAngelo (1986) and 
Kothari et al. (2005) estimates of discretionary accruals are significant at the 5 percent level. 
However, this lead to the acceptance of the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the 
residuals of these three models. Acceptance of the null hypothesis is desirable for a good model.
Equally, the error term must have a constant variance over time in a time series data. This 
implies that the variance of the error term cannot change for each observation or range of 
observations (Studenmund, 2011). Where the variance of the error term does change, there is 
heteroskedasticity present in the error term. However, the Breusch-Pagan Godfrey test for 
heteroskedasticity reveals that only the Kothari et al. (2005) accrual model is significant at 10 
percent level and the error term is homoscedastic (constant error term). Moreover, the error term 
of Jones (1991), modified Jones (1995), Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986) accrual models are 
not constant (heteroscedastic).
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Additionally, the error term should be normally distributed (bell-shaped). The Jarque- 
Bera tests for normal distribution test disclose the model that is symmetrical and normally 
distributed. Based on the estimated p-values of Jarque-Bera test, residuals are normally 
distributed in the case of the entire estimated model. However, from the aforementioned results, 
the study recommends that the best model for the estimation of discretionary accruals in the case 
of Nigerian firms is based on Kothari et al. (2005), as the estimated statistics are constantly 
accepting corresponding five hypotheses o f the best fit. Therefore, the interpretation of our 
estimated results will be by Kothari et al. (2005) model.
Table 4.3: Determining the Best Regression Model
Classical Assumptions
I II III IV V
Jones
Modified
Jones Healy DeAngelo Kothari
R2 0.307 0.023 0.016 0.016 0.522
F-stats (p-value) 0.005** 0.030* 0.135 0.135 0 .0 0 0 **
Breusch Godfrey 
LM test (p-value) 0.151 0.183 0 .0 0 1 ** 0 .0 0 1 ** 0 .0 0 1 **
Breusch-Pagan 
Godfrey (p-value) 0.188 0.203 0.162 0.162 0.070*
Jarque-Bera 
Test (p-value) 0 .0 0 0 ** 0 .0 0 0 ** 0 .0 0 0 ** 0 .0 0 0 ** 0 .0 0 0 **
**, * indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 10% level, respectively (two-sided test).
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4.3.2 Results Pertaining to Research Question 2 - The Magnitude of Earnings 
Management in Nigeria
The usual starting point of the measurement of discretionary accruals is total accruals, 
and then a particular model is used to calculate non-discretionary component of total accruals. 
By subtracting non-discretionary accruals from total accruals, the magnitude of accruals is 
determined. In estimating the magnitude of earnings management of Nigerian firms, the study 
considers five models for generating non-discretionary accruals. The models are general 
representations of those that have been used in the extant earnings management literature. 
However, since absolute discretionary accrual is a proxy for earnings management, the study 
documents that the level of earnings management of Nigerian publicly-listed firms is 5.02 
percent. This estimate is based on Kothari et al. (2005) model. The study considers Kothari et al. 
(2005) estimate since the model specification is identified as the best-fitted model using Nigerian 
data. Further, authors such as Dechow et al. (1995) document severe-misspecification error as 
the limitation inherent in the use of discretionary accruals models such as Jones (1991), modified 
Jones (1995), Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986)4 models as a proxy for estimating earnings 
management.
Nonetheless, the estimate of earnings management among publicly-listed Nigerian firms 
is relatively close to earnings management of South African firms at 5.6 percent (Leuz et al. 
2002, p.515)s. The study also documents that the manufacturing and energy sector in Nigeria has 
the highest average discretionary accruals of 48.38 percent. This is an indication that earnings 
management is rampant within the manufacturing industry of the Nigerian economy followed by
4 Discretionary accruals in other estimated models are as follows: Jones (-17.74%), modified Jones (-18.20%),
Healy (0.96) and DeAngelo (0.97%).
5 Discretionary accruals in other developing nations are as follows: The Philippines (8.8%), Malaysia (14.8%), 
Pakistan (17.8%), Thailand (18.3%), Indonesia (18.3%) and India (19.1%) [Leuz et al. 2002, p.515].
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consumer goods sector with 41.93 percent. In contrast, services sector in Nigeria shows the level 
of earnings management of 9.67 percent on average, as shown in table 4.4 below. Consequently, 
it is imperative to note that the larger the absolute value of discretionary accruals, the higher the 
presence of earnings management and the lower the quality of financial reporting of Nigerian 
firms and vice versa. According to the result of Kothari et al (2005), it can be concluded that the 
quality of financial reporting of Nigerian firms is high compared to firms in South Africa and 
other developing nations ( r e f e r  t o  f o o t n o t e  5 ) .  Therefore, the result is consistent with the stated 
hypothesis number 2 that the higher/lower the level of discretionary accruals, the lower/higher 
the quality of financial reporting of firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE).
Table 4.4: Nigeria Industry-Wise Earnings Management
Dummy
Variables
Industry Subsector Number of 
Observation
Average
Discretionary
Accruals
D1 Consumer Goods Consumer staples and 
Consumer discretionary 620 41.93%
D2 Manufacturing and 
Energy
Industrial, Material and 
Oil & Gas 620 48.38%
D3 Services Healthcare, Financial and 
T elecommunications 620 9.67%
N o t e :  T h i s  t a b l e  p r e s e n t s  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  s e c t o r - w i s e  a v e r a g e  d i s c r e t i o n a r y  a c c r u a l s  o f  6 2  
N i g e r i a n  f i r m s  l i s t e d  o n  t h e  c o u n t r y ’s  s t o c k  e x c h a n g e  f r o m  2 0 0 3 - 2 0 1 2 .  A v e r a g e  d i s c r e t i o n a r y  
a c c r u a l s  a r e  m u l t i p l i e d  b y  1 0 0  t o  g e t  a v e r a g e  i n  p e r c e n t a g e .  D 1  r e p r e s e n t s  d u m m y  v a r i a b l e  f o r  
f i r m s  i n  C o n s u m e r  g o o d s  i n d u s t r y  w h i c h  c o m p r i s e s  o f  C o n s u m e r  s t a p l e s  a n d  C o n s u m e r  
d i s c r e t i o n a r y  s u b s e c t o r .  D 2  i s  a  d u m m y  v a r i a b l e  f o r  f i r m s  w i t h i n  t h e  M a n u f a c t u r i n g  a n d  E n e r g y  
i n d u s t r y  s u c h  a s  I n d u s t r i a l s ,  M a t e r i a l s  a n d  E n e r g y .  D 3  i s  a  d u m m y  v a r i a b l e  f o r  f i r m s  i n  S e r v i c e s  
i n d u s t r y  w h i c h  i n c l u d e s  H e a l t h c a r e ,  F i n a n c i a l s ,  a n d  T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  s u b s e c t o r .
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4.3.3 Regression Results on Earnings Management Hypotheses
Table 4.5 includes the estimated regression coefficients of the base models. Each of the 
five discretionary accruals is considered as the dependent variable in individual regressions. For 
instance, column II reports the regression results that use discretionary accruals derived from the 
modified Jones model as the dependent variable. The result from table 4.5 suggests that LEV 
(leverage) is insignificant across all model specifications. This implies that the extent of debt 
financing does not have any impact on earnings management (financial restatement) in the case 
of Nigerian firms. This observation is not unexpected given that Norman et al. (2005) observe 
both positive and negative impact of leverage on discretionary accruals, indicating that the effect 
of leverage on earnings management could be bi-directional. Nonetheless, though the authors’ 
estimated coefficients are found insignificant, the effect of leverage on discretionary accruals 
could either be positive (e.g. Healy, 0.038; DeAngelo, 0.039 and Kothari e al., 0.005) or negative 
(e.g. Jones,-0.087; and Modified Jones,-0.096). Both mixed and insignificant coefficient of LEV 
does not lend outright support for the positive association between firms debt financing and 
accounting restatement, and thus reject hypothesis number 3 that leverage is positively 
associated with the likelihood of financial accounting restatements.
In the models, FIRM SIZE is significant and negative across the five model specification 
at the 1 percent level. The regression coefficients are -1.275 and -1.354 for Jones (1991) and 
modified Jones (1995) model respectively, -0.338 and -0.344 for Healy (1985) and DeAngelo 
(1986) model, respectively, and -0.636 for Kothari et al. (2005) model. The estimated results are 
consistent with the hypothesis number 4 that firm size is negatively related to earnings 
management. This implies that large firms take into perspective reputation cost in engaging in
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earnings management. This finding coincides with the evidence in Kim et al. (2003). Therefore, 
large Nigerian firms engaged less in earnings management.
Since debt covenant is insignificant in the case of Nigerian firms in table 4.5, the findings 
coincide with the view of Watt and Zimmerman (1986) that firms that are close to the violation 
of their debt agreements adopt accounting choices that lower the likelihood of their default. The 
result also contrasts with DeAngelo et al. (1994) that document income-decreasing discretionary 
accruals of firms seeking to obtain better terms in debt contract renegotiation. This 
pronouncement could mean that the cohort of Nigerian firms in our analysis are neither close to 
violation of their debt agreements nor in the process of renegotiating their debt contracts during 
the sample period. From the aforementioned, it draws to the conclusion to reject the hypothesis 
of an existence of a positive relationship between debt covenant and earnings management as 
indicated in hypothesis number 5.
Furthermore, the results exhibit that the relationship between GROWTH and earnings 
management is significantly negative. For instance, the coefficient of GROWTH is -0.003 and - 
0.001, significant at the 5 percent level, under the Jones (1991) and modified Jones (1995) 
model, and -0.013, significant at the lpercent level under Kothari et al. model (2005). The 
coefficient of GROWTH is both statistically insignificant and economically negligible under the 
Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986) models. The estimated coefficient suggests that high growth 
firms experience low level of earnings management in Nigeria. The results are however, 
inconsistent with prior literature and the stated hypothesis; therefore this study recommends the 
rejection of the hypothesis that GROWTH is positively related to earnings management as stated 
in hypothesis number 6 . These findings are in contrast to the views of McNichols (2000). The 
author documents that “growth firms are likely to exhibit positive discretionary accrual
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estimates, and that a comparison of their estimated discretionary accruals to those of firms with 
lower growth can lead to a conclusion of greater earnings management by these firms” 
(McNichols, 2000, p.332). This study however does not find similar evidence in the case of 
Nigerian firms.
Finally, this empirical evidence documents that the coefficient of ROA is positive but 
insignificant across the models. The estimated result indicates that the economic performance of 
Nigerian firms does not directly influence earnings management. This also suggests that 
Nigerian firms may not engage in performance related abnormal accruals to manipulate their 
reported financial results. In addition, this result is in contrast with hypothesis number 7 that 
return on assets is positively related to earnings management. Thus, the result is also in 
divergence with the argument of Myers and Skinner (2007) that firms manipulate their current 
year reported earnings to sustain prior years’ economic performance.
In summary, the empirical results show that firms with low growth and small-sized firms 
in Nigeria are more exposed to earnings management. Given the fact that the main purpose of 
earnings management is to maximize share value, the extent of earnings management among 
these sorts of firms is not unlikely in Nigeria.
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Table 4.5: Regression Results on Earnings Management Models
Base Regression models
I II III IV V
Jones
Modified
Jones Healy DeAngelo Kothari
I n t e r c e p t 8.796** 10.415** 2.370* 2.409* 3.311*
(0 .0 1 1 ) (0.005) (0.053) (0.053) (0.017)
GROWTH -0.003** -0 .0 0 1 ** -1.06E -1.07E -0.013***
(0.034) (0.039) (0.982) (0.982) (0 .0 0 0 )
LEV -0.087 -0.096 0.038 0.039 0.005
(0.811) (0.807) (0.764) (0.764) (0.970)
FIRM SIZE -1.275*** -1.354*** -0.338*** -0.344*** -0.636***
(0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0.007) (0.007) (0 .0 0 0 )
ROA 4.332 4.619 1.487 1.512 2.849
(0.347) (0.353) (0.365) (0.365) (0.128)
D2 -1.054 -1.124 0.538 0.547 0.139
(0.420) (0.426) (0.249) (0.249) (0.792)
D3 0.579 0.684 0.491 0.499 0.498
(0.792) (0.773) (0.773) (0.531) (0.576)
R2 0.031 0.023 0.016 0.016 0.522
A djR 2 0.021 0.013 0.006 0.006 0.517
F-stats 3.122*** 2.347** 1.632 1.632 107.63***
(0.005) (0.030) (0.135) (0.135) (0 .0 0 0 )
N 598 598 598 598 598
Note: T h e  d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  i s  d i s c r e t i o n a r y  a c c r u a l s  f r o m  t h e  f i v e  m o d e l s  o f  6 2  N i g e r i a n  f i r m s  
l i s t e d  o n  t h e  N i g e r i a n  S t o c k  E x c h a n g e  ( N S E )  f o r  t h e  p e r i o d  o f  2 0 0 3 - 2 0 1 2 .  G R O W T H  i s  d e f i n e d  
a s  c h a n g e  i n  s a l e s  d i v i d e d  b y  s a l e s  i n  y e a r  t - 1  i n  p e r c e n t a g e .  L E V  i s  d e f i n e d  a s  f i r m s  t o t a l  d e b t  
d i v i d e d  b y  t o t a l  a s s e t s .  F I R M  S I Z E  i s  d e f i n e d  a s  t h e  n a t u r a l  l o g  o f  t o t a l  a s s e t s  o f  f i r m s .  R O A  
r e p r e s e n t s  f i r m s ’ e a r n i n g s  b e f o r e  i n t e r e s t  a n d  t a x e s  d i v i d e d  b y  t o t a l  a s s e t s .  D 2  a n d  D 3  a r e  
d u m m y  v a r i a b l e s  r e p r e s e n t i n g  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  a n d  e n e r g y ,  a n d  s e r v i c e s  i n d u s t r i e s ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .
Figures above in parentheses are the p-values.
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively (two-sided test).
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4.3.4 Regression Results of the Effect of Share Ownership on Earnings Management
Results from panels A to D in Table 4.6 suggest ownership structure is insignificant in 
explaining earnings management among the Nigerian firms. This finding does not give a clear 
indication of the relationship between ownership structure and earnings management according 
to the stated hypothesis number 1. The results are also inconsistent with the view that 
decomposed ownership structure discourages active involvement in earnings management 
according to Hsu and Koh (2005). However, Dabor and Adeyemi (2012) argue that an effective 
mechanism to constrain earnings management is the development of an appropriate ownership 
structure.
Panel A shows the impact of institutional ownership on earnings management among 
Nigerian firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE). The result of Kothari et al. (2005) 
stipulates an insignificant negative effect of INST on earnings management. This implies that the 
role of institutional shareholding in Nigerian business environment does not have any effect on 
managerial discretion to engage in earnings management. This finding is in contrast with the 
notion that institutional ownership restrains managers’ earnings management activities and also 
decreases managerial incentives to adopt aggressive earnings management behaviors (Koh, 2003, 
p. 109).
Panel B and C show the impacts of insider ownership on earnings management among 
Nigerian firms listed on the stock exchange. The study finds that managerial ownership among 
the Nigerian firms has an insignificant effect on discretionary behavior of managers. This 
suggests that managerial ownership has no deterministic effect on earnings management on 
Nigerian firms. Importantly, allowing CEO to become a part of ownership in Nigerian 
companies does not resolve the problem of earnings management whereas extant literature
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suggests a significant negative impact of CEO ownership on discretionary accruals. As an 
example, a prior empirical study, such as Gabrielsen et al. (2002), contradicts the findings in 
relation to Nigerian firms. In a sample of Danish firms, Gabrielsen et al. (2002) however 
document a non-significant positive relationship between managerial ownership and 
discretionary accruals. Therefore, the insignificant findings on managerial ownership-eamings 
management relationship in the case of Nigerian firms are not completely unlikely.
Panel D shows the impact of individual ownership on earnings management among the 
firms on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The estimated result suggests a positive but non­
significant effect of individual ownership on discretionary accruals across four earnings 
management models and a negative but insignificant coefficient of INDV on discretionary 
earnings in the case of Kothari et al. (2005). Though average individual ownership among 
publicly-listed Nigerian firms lies in between 7 percent and 42 percent, most of these individual 
owners hold small fraction of total ownership. In addition, majority of ownership is held by 
government and its entities, thus the influence of individual level ownership in controlling the 
problem of earnings management is minimal. This evidence is consistent with Zhong et al. 
(2007) as the author find a significant positive relationship between blockholder ownership and 
discretionary accruals.
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Table 4.6: Relationship Between Ownership Variables and Earnings Management
Panel A: Regression results including Institutional Ownership as an independent variable
I II III IV V
Jones
Modified
Jones Healy DeAngelo Kothari
I n t e r c e p t 9.016** 10.016** 9.804** 9.965** 9.002**
(0.024) (0 .0 1 2 ) (0.014) (0.014) (0.026)
GROWTH -1.454*** -1.586*** 0 .102*** 0.103*** -0.297***
(0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0.005) (0.005) (0 .0 0 0 )
LEV 0.507 0.516 0.428 0.435 0.453
(0.345) (0.336) (0.425) (0.425) (0.405)
FIRM SIZE -1.255*** -1.254*** -1.182*** -1.2 0 1 *** -1.264***
(0 .0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 1 ) (0.009) (0 .0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 1 )
ROA 8 .0 1 2 * 7.990* 8.385* 8.523* 8.336*
(0.075) (0.076) (0.063) (0.063) (0.068)
INST -0.153 -0.154 -0.144 -0.146 -0.146
(0 .112) (0 .111) (0 .111) (0.137) (0.139)
D2 1.916 1.884 1.852 1.882 1.958
(0.115) (0 .121) (0.128) (0.128) (0 .112)
D3 0.456 0.461 0.279 0.283 0.474
(0.823) (0.821) (0.892) (0.892) (0.819)
R2 0 .888 0.904 0.083 0.083 0.292
A djR 2 0.885 0.901 0.054 0.054 0.270
F-stats 246.1*** 293.1*** 2.828*** 2.828*** 12.785***
(0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0.007) (0.007) (0 .0 0 0 )
N 224 224 224 224 224
Figures above in parentheses are the p-values.
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively (two-sided test).
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Panel B: Regression results including CEO ownership as an independent variable
I II III IV V
Jones
Modified
Jones Healy DeAngelo Kothari
I n t e r c e p t -1.819*** -0.823 -0.126 -0.128 -1.605***
(0 .0 0 0 ) (0.104) (0.311) (0.311) (0 .0 0 0 )
GROWTH -1.467*** -1 5 9 9 *** 0.090*** 0.092*** -0.310***
(0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 )
LEV 0.031 0.035 0.011 0.011 0.025
(0.254) (0 .2 1 1 ) (0.124) (0.124) (0.050)**
FIRM SIZE 0.018 0.018 0.006 0.006 0.000
(0.750) (0.756) (0.672) (0.672) (0.982)
ROA 0.899 1.072 0.451*** 0.458*** 0.921***
(0.173) (0 .122) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0.004)
CEO 0.006 0.005 - 0.000 - 0.000 -0.011
(0.546) (0.589) (0.846) (0.846) (0.139)
D2 0.038 0 .0 1 0 -0.066 -0.067 -0.037
(0.810) (0.950) (0.116) (0.116) (0.627)
D3 0.194 0.182 -0.006 -0.006 0.068
(0.258) (0.312) (0.890) (0.890) (0.404)
R2 0.999 0.999 0.997 0.997 0.999
A djR2 0.999 0.999 0.996 0.996 0.999
F-stats 5778*** 62375*** 3231.27*** 3231.27*** 11261.42***
(0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 )
N 75 75 75 75 75
Figures above in parentheses are the p-values.
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively (two-sided test).
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Panel C: Regression results including Chairman Ownership as an independent variable
I II III IV V
Jones
Modified
Jones Healy DeAngelo Kothari
I n t e r c e p t 22.225** 25.164** -2 .100* -2.135* 3.947*
(0.047) (0.039) (0.076) (0.076) (0.058)
GROWTH -0.383*** -0.420*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.116***
(0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 )
LEV -0 .6 8 6 -0.747 0.082 0.084 -0.128
(0.556) (0.556) (0.503) (0.503) (0.555)
FIRM SIZE -2.425** -2.627** 0.219** 0.223** -0.544***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.040) (0.040) (0.004)
ROA 9.797 10.814 -1.421 -1.444 1.047*
(0.473) (0.467) (0.325) (0.325) (0.068)
CHAIR 0.009 0.011 -0.004 -0.004 -0 .0 1 0
(0.969) (0.966) (0.872) (0.872) (0.827)
D2 -5.088 -5.523 0.487 0.495 -0.997
(0.147) (0.148) (0.189) (0.189) (0.627)
D3 -3.279 -3.552 0.317 0.322 -0.630
(0.568) (0.570) (0.601) (0.601) (0.557)
R2 0.367 0.370 0.184 0.184 0.596
Adj R2 0.342 0.345 0.151 0.151 0.580
F-stats 14.458*** 14.656*** 5.613*** 5.613*** 36.736***
(0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 )
N 182 182 182 182 182
Figures above in parentheses are the p-values.
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5 %  and 10%, respectively (two-sided test).
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Panel D: Regression results including Individual Ownership as an independent variable
I II III IV V
Jones
Modified
Jones Healy DeAngelo Kothari
I n t e r c e p t 4.461 5.475* 4.958* 5.039* 4.316
(0.136) (0.067) (0.095) (0.095) (0.153)
GROWTH -1.457*** -1.589*** 0.098*** 0 .100*** -0.301***
(0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 0 )
LEV 0.035 0.047 0.002 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 1 0
(0.895) (0.861) (0.992) (0.992) (0.969)
FIRM SIZE -0.843*** -0.844*** -0.748*** -0.761*** -0.841***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003)
ROA 6.502* 6.501* 7.650** 7.775** 7.391*
(0.091) (0.097) (0.045) (0.045) (0.057)
INDV 0 .0 0 2 0.001 0.003 0.003 - 0.000
(0.958) (0.970) (0.939) (0.939) (0.990)
D2 1.286 1.270 1.228 1.248 1.319
(0.181) (0.186) (0.197) (0.197) (0.174)
D3 0.729 0.742 0.650 0.661 0.777
(0.643) (0.636) (0.676) (0.676) (0.624)
R2 0.884 0.901 0.066 0.066 0.280
Adj R2 0.882 0.899 0.043 0.043 0.262
F-stats 308.87*** 367.50*** 5.856*** 2.856*** 15.648***
(0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0.006) (0.006) (0 .0 0 0 )
N 289 289 289 289 289
Figures above in parentheses are the p-values.
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively (two-sided test).
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4.3.5 Results Pertaining to Research Question 3 - Characteristics of Nigerian Firms That
Are Potential Candidates for Earnings Management
The study validates the selection of the variables used in earlier studies by showing 
whether the size of an average Nigerian firm (FIRM SIZE), high profitability (GROWTH), 
managerial efficiency in assets usage (ROA), debt covenant behaviours (LEV) and ownership 
structure of Nigerian firms have direct impact on the level of discretionary accruals. The study 
documents that the larger the Nigerian firms, the lower their level of discretionary accruals. This 
is an indication that large firms in Nigeria take into consideration reputation cost and regulatory 
penalty among other consequences of earnings management and tend to engage less in earnings 
manipulation.
Likewise, GROWTH suggests that high profitable firms in Nigeria adopt income- 
decreasing accounting choices as managers seek to store up positive earnings for future period or 
future corporate events according to the big bath earnings management hypothesis. The Healy’s 
(1985) big bath earnings management hypothesis assumption is of the view that executive 
management of firms has incentives to choose income-decreasing discretionary accruals to delay 
the recognition of current period revenue to the future period (taking a big bath). This further 
explains that managers within the contest o f Nigerian firms will seek to exercise discretion to 
increase administrative expenses in the current year for potential benefit in the future year(s) 
rather than income-increasing manipulations that could be easily detected by the auditors in the 
current year. Additionally, based on Kothari et al. (2005) model-specified estimates of 
discretionary accruals, in Table 4.6 (panel A-D), the study finds that high profitable Nigerian 
firms prefer high magnitude of earnings management. Meanwhile, the ROA suggests that
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Nigerian firms efficiently utilize their assets in generating revenue that contribute to their high 
profitability.
The findings corresponding to ownership structure reveal that institutional, managerial 
and individual ownership do not have any significant impact to resolve the concern related to 
earnings management. As government and its affiliated entities hold almost 60 percent of 
ownership, on average, among the Nigerian publicly listed companies, such insignificant role of 
other shareholders is however not fully unlikely.
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Chapter Five: Conclusions
This study documents systematic differences in earnings management of publicly listed 
companies in Nigeria considering firm characteristics and their ownership structure in the period 
from 2003-2012. The findings touch on the magnitude of earning management in Nigeria and 
relative to other countries. The study also performs industry-wise earnings management of 
Nigerian economic sectors to determine whether earnings management is excessive. 
Additionally, the study finds results regarding the quality of financial reporting of Nigerian firms 
including the information content and overall impact of accounting restatements. The study 
observes mixed results from the regression analysis, suggesting that some firm characteristics are 
key determinants for explaining earnings management among Nigerian companies and share 
ownership structure is insignificant in explaining earnings management among Nigerian 
companies. Policy implications and recommendations on how earnings management can be 
curtailed are made. Finally, the limitation faced in the study is mentioned.
In contrast to most of the existing research, this study includes five discretionary accruals 
models to examine which model specification has the greatest statistical power to explain 
earnings management in the case of publicly-listed Nigerian firms. Using the classical 
assumptions, the results suggest that the Kothari et al. (2005) performance-matched model 
provides better explanatory power on earnings management in the Nigerian context. Importantly, 
the results of the study illustrate that the aggregate earnings management for Nigeria is 5.02 
percent. The aggregate discretionary accruals implies that publicly-listed firms in Nigeria engage 
less in earnings management compared to other developing nations (Leuz et al. 2003). 
Furthermore, the quality of financial reporting is high for Nigerian companies compared to
companies in other developing nations (e.g. the Philippines, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand, 
Indonesia and India where earnings management is perceived to a range between 8 .8  to 19 
percent) [Leuz et al. 2003].
Nevertheless, after the industry-wise decomposition of earnings management in Nigeria, 
the finding shows that the Manufacturing and Energy sector of the Nigerian economy has the 
highest level of earnings management at 48.38 percent. This sector includes the Industrial, 
Material, and the Oil and Gas subsector of the Nigerian economy. The excessive manipulation of 
earnings in this sector could be a result of high import, export duties and other relevant tariffs on 
the operations of the firms. Additionally, the second sector in which earnings management is 
rampant is the Consumer Goods sector with 41.93 percent. This segment of the economy 
represents the consumer discretionary and consumer staples such as Food and Beverages, 
Tobacco and household items, Apparel, Automobile and Components. Finally, the Services 
sector (Financial, Healthcare and Telecommunications) is the least manipulative sector with the 
earnings management percentage of 9.67 percent. The result of this sector, especially the 
financial service subsector of the industry, could be attributed to the strict legal and regulatory 
requirements such as the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act of 1991 (BOFLA). Overall, 
the industry-wise analysis reveals that the services sector has a higher quality of financial 
reporting compared to other sector of the Nigerian economy.
Inevitably, the finding also indicates that the dynamism of share ownership does not 
influence the level of earnings management in Nigeria. The result is contrast to extant literature 
that ownership structures influence the discretionary behaviour of the firm. In this instance, the 
study documents that individual (INDV) ownership concentration does not have significant 
effect on the discretionary accruals. This in essence means that when there is greater separation
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between owners and managers, the managers do not face much pressure to meet shareholders’ 
expectation as well as from the capital market to signal the firms’ value to the market. On the 
other hand, insiders such as the CEO and CHAIR show signs that they will become more 
involved in the firm when they have stakes in the firm but the result is insignificant at any level. 
It should be noted that the need for outside monitoring o f managers activities will reduce as long 
as the significant interests of insider shareholders (CEO and CHAIR) and external shareholders 
converge. This is because:
When insider ownership is below 25 percent, insider ownership has a positive 
(negative) effect on the information content o f earnings (discretionary accruals) 
according to the agency theory predictions, but above this level managers are 
entrenched and the relationship reverses on both variables (Yeo et al. 2002, p.
1034).
Additionally, institutional (INST) ownership has no significant effect on earnings 
management of publicly-listed companies in Nigeria. This is also inconsistent with the fact that 
the presence of unrelated external shareholders such as INST should influence the discretionary 
behaviour of firms. For instance, Yeo et al. (2002) document that “the existence of substantial 
external unrelated shareholders leads to closer monitoring of the executive management that 
indicate lesser opportunity to manipulate the reported earnings” (p. 1025).
Consequently, the findings in this study therefore have critical policy implications in real 
world of Nigerian business environment. First, insider ownership such as the CEO and CHAIR 
should be encouraged to have significant ownership within the firms they are managing. This 
will help to solve the agency problem if not eliminate earnings management completely in
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Nigeria. However, it will also ensure that the activities of the CEO and CHAIR would be geared 
towards the primary objective of share value maximization of the firm.
Second, INST should also retain more significant ownership to increase the level of 
monitoring of the activities of the executive management. The retention of significant ownership 
by INST will reduce managerial incentive to employ aggressive earnings management activities 
(Koh, 2003). Meanwhile, since 60 percent of share ownership belongs to either the government 
or their affiliates and the high profile political class in Nigeria, the regulatory authorities should 
ensure that such ownership is geared to influence the reduction of earnings management in 
Nigeria. Therefore, control mechanisms such as ownership thresholds, which will check 
excessive share ownership of these insider and external shareholders, should also be formulated 
by the relevant regulatory authority.
Third, LEV is found insignificant across all estimated models whereas this variable has 
been used as a proxy for financial accounting restatement. Nonetheless, such restatement should 
have a significant influence on determining the quality of earnings management. Given this 
contradictory evidence, it is recommended that the appropriate regulatory authority in Nigeria 
should maintain a database of financial accounting restatements of firms listed on the Nigeria 
Stock Exchange (NSE) since some of these restatements are technically used to achieve financial 
reporting fraud. For instance, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
maintains the GAO Financial Restatement Database (GAO-06- 1079sp) to keep track of 
restatement announcements that they identified as having been made because of financial 
reporting fraud and/or accounting errors (US. GAO, 2015). In addition, the US GAO database 
also issues trend update on publicly listed firms, market impacts assessment and regulatory 
enforcement activities on accounting restatements (US. GAO, 2015). Finally, stricter financial
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reporting guidelines and regulatory frameworks such as the recently adopted Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) should be implemented fully across all sectors to boost credibility and quality 
of financial reporting within the Nigerian business environment.
This study contributes to existing earnings management literature taking into account the 
publicly listed firms in Nigeria over a decade. While similar studies have been carried out in 
Nigeria, the authors have only used one type of model (modified Jones model). This study draws 
out further limitations of these past studies from their use of survey instruments and hypothetical 
figures for the research of this high magnitude. However, the views of these authors cannot be 
conjured into any policy recommendation for the Nigerian corporate sector.
Meanwhile, the limitations faced in this study are the estimation of missing data and the 
omission of several other business-specific factors such as the size of workforce, the production 
volume and the effect of takeover bid. Although, missing data is common in studies related to 
developing countries like Nigeria, the findings of this study have significant policy implication 
for Nigerian corporate entities. Accordingly, future research is needed to determine the pre and 
post adoption impact of the newly adopted International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) on 
accounting quality among Nigerian firms using Barth et al. (2008) model of empirical 
investigation. Lastly, the pattern of earnings management in Nigeria during economic cycle 
including cultural factors and corruption index will also be important area o f future studies.
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